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Cyber-Shilling in Automobile Auctions:  
Evidence from a Field Experiment†
By David Grether, David Porter, and Matthew Shum*
We run a large field experiment with an online company specializing 
in selling used automobiles via ascending auctions. We manipulate 
experimentally the “price grid,” or the possible amounts that bidders 
can bid above the current standing price. Using two diverse auction 
sites, one in New York and one in Texas, we find that buyer and seller 
behavior differs strikingly across the two sites. Specifically, in Texas 
we find peculiar patterns of bidding among a small but prominent 
group of buyers suggesting that they are “cyber-shills” working on 
behalf of sellers. These patterns do not appear in the New York auc-
tions. (JEL C93, D12, D44, L62, L81)
For the past two decades, the possibilities of online retailing have transformed the retail landscape. When Internet-based retailers and resellers first appeared, 
they were hailed as initiating a new era of retailing which would see an end to the 
search frictions and transactions costs that characterize the brick-and-mortar shop-
ping experience. While it is true that online retailing has made shopping much more 
convenient for many consumers, there is mounting evidence that anonymity—a 
defining characteristic of online commerce—has introduced new possibilities for 
buyer and seller manipulation and mischief in retail markets that were not present 
in  brick-and-mortar settings. As examples, in an online setting, it is easy for retail-
ers to hide, or “shroud,” certain attributes of a transaction (such as shipping costs), 
which can lead consumers to end up paying much more than they intended to for 
a given product. Also, in most online marketplaces, it is relatively straightforward 
for buyers and sellers to change their identities, or maintain multiple identities— 
“cyber-shilling,” in the parlance of the popular press—thus increasing the possibili-
ties for fraudulent transactions.1 Indeed, the largest online marketplaces (including 
eBay and Amazon) maintain a large workforce to police and verify claims against 
the hordes of buyers and sellers using their platforms.
1 See Gabaix and Laibson (2006); Ellison and Ellison (2009); Jin and Kato (2006). There are also many stories 
in the popular press of sellers using fake accounts or contractors to write positive reviews of their own products. 
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In this paper, we present a case study from a large online used car auctioneer, 
and document several striking types of buyer and seller behavior within these online 
car auctions. The data used in our analysis derive from a set of field experiments 
that were performed on the online automobile auctions run by Copart, Inc., one of 
the largest sellers of salvage vehicles worldwide. We analyzed data from 24 online 
auctions at two auction locations (New York and Texas) at which approximately 
15,000 vehicles were auctioned.
The auctions held in Texas revealed some puzzling behavior by the buyers. There, 
we found a frequent tendency for bidders to raise their own standing bids repeti-
tively. While this behavior has been linked with strategic behavior (see Cramton 
1997), the pattern we found does not fit that type of conduct. After a closer investi-
gation, we found that most of this “repeat bidding” behavior can be explained by a 
small and peculiar group of buyers present in the auctions. Features of these bidders’ 
behavior strongly hint at their being “shill” bidders confederate with sellers, who 
attempt to drive up the price of the cars. Each of these bidders bid almost exclusively 
for cars sold from a particular seller. Additionally, these bidders bid frequently, but 
almost never consummate a sale. However, we also find that this suspected shill bid-
ding strategy is not clearly successful for the sellers who employ it; there were very 
few auctions in which the shill bidders submitted the second-highest bid and, thus, 
played the role of marginal price setters.
However, these behavioral patterns are not present in the New York-area auc-
tions. One explanation for the differences between these two locales is the makeup 
of the car sellers: car dealers are much more prominent in Texas, selling almost 
half the cars, but dealers make up only 10 percent of the sales in New York. We 
conjecture that perhaps used car dealers—with lower storage costs and higher out-
side options—are more willing to engage in surreptitious misbehavior (such as shill 
bidding), and indeed, the “shill bidders” we observed in Texas were always bidding 
for cars sold by dealers. As far as we are aware, these results constitute some of the 
first direct evidence of shill bidding in online auction markets. Anecdotally, this pos-
sibility has been raised, and it has been studied in lab experiments,2 but this paper 
appears among the first to present credible evidence of shill bidding in the field.
Our findings emerge within the context of a set of field experiments which 
were designed to examine the role of a price grid—or “click box bidding,” as it is 
known—on bidding behavior in ascending auctions. Against the backdrop of the 
spectrum auctions run by the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in 
which bidders allegedly colluded using a “trailing digits” jump-bidding strategy3 
whereby the final three digits in a bid signaled to rival bidders the license where they 
would be punished if they persisted in bidding on a specific license,4 we intended to 
examine how a price grid—which rules out this type of behavior by restricting the 
bids that could be submitted—would affect bidding behavior and revenue. In these 
2 See Kosmopoulou and de Silva (2007). 
3 See Cramton and Schwartz (2000) for details of this strategy. 
4 Market numbers are two or three digits and bids are typically six figures or more, so a bid could contain, at 
negligible cost, the market number as its last few digits, prefaced by leading zeroes to highlight the trailing digits. 
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auctions, we varied experimentally the price grid which restricts a bidder to select a 
bid on a grid that consists of integer multiples of a given bid increment.5
Manipulation of the price grid interlaces with several phenomena that have been 
commonly observed in real-world auctions. First, jump bidding is an endemic feature 
of real-world ascending auctions; this includes not only the FCC wireless spectrum 
auctions6 mentioned above, but also online (eBay) auctions, and also conventional 
art and antiquities auctions run by Sotheby’s and Christies for hundreds of years.7 
Indeed, the prevalence of jump bidding presents a puzzle for standard auction the-
ory;8 as a result, there is a small but growing theoretical literature explaining jump 
bidding from a strategic perspective.9
A second set of phenomena that will be affected by our manipulations of the 
grid size is the degree that bidders learn and update their valuations for the goods 
being sold by observing what rivals bid.10 In auctions where the objects for sale 
have a common value component, bidders will typically increase their expectation 
of the object’s value upon observing more aggressive bidding behavior by the rivals. 
Additionally, rapidly escalating prices may make the auction more emotionally 
exciting, which may encourage more aggressive bidding by other bidders.11
This, in turn, raises the possibility that wily sellers may employ confederate 
shill bidders who submit aggressive bids in order to drive up prices in an auction. 
Moreover, because a coarser price grid enables more aggressive bidding (i.e., enables 
bidders to place bids much above the current standing price), we may expect shills 
to bid more prominently under a coarser price grid. Shills may take advantage of the 
larger jump opportunities available under a coarser price grid in order to mislead or 
excite the nonshill bidders. Indeed, we find that our suspected shill bidders employ 
large jump bids more frequently than other bidders; patterns such as these demon-
strate how the experimental changes in the price grid connects with the calculus of 
shill bidding.
5 Thus, if the increment amount were 10 percent for a particular object, any bid submitted for that object was 
restricted to be equal to the Standing Bid times (1 + 0.10 π), where π is a positive integer greater than or equal 
to 1 but less than 10. 
6 See Isaac, Salmon, and Zillante (2007); Plott and Salmon (2004); and Cramton (1997) for details of this 
behavior. 
7 Jump bidding has also been observed in many experimental implementations of ascending auctions (McCabe, 
Rassenti, and Smith 1990; Banks et al. 2003; Coppinger, Smith, and Titus 1980; and Lucking-Reiley 1999). 
8 For book-length treatments of auction theory, see Milgrom (2004) and Krishna (2002). In one standard model 
of English auctions—the so-called “clock” or “button” auction (Milgrom and Weber 1982)—the price is set by a 
clock which rises automatically, and bidders indicate their willingness to pay the current price by holding down a 
button. Once a bidder releases his button, however, he “drops out” of the auction, and can no longer reenter. In such 
a setting, it is not obvious what benefits bidders derive from “speeding up the clock” by jumping. 
9 This includes Avery’s (1998) model of jump bidding as a means for bidder intimidation in an affiliated values 
setting. Other models of jump bidding, primarily in the independent private values setting, include Daniel and 
Hirschleifer (1998); Easley and Tenorio (2004); Hoerner and Sahuguet (2007); and Isaac, Salmon, and Zillante 
(2007). 
10 See Milgrom and Weber (1982) or Hong and Shum (2003). 
11 cf. Ding et al. (2005). 
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I. Field Experiments: Used-Car Auctions at copart.com
We designed a set of unique field experiments12 using an online ascending auc-
tion for automobiles. Specifically, we created an experiment with Copart Inc., a 
publicly-traded (NASDAQ: CPRT) company that is the largest auction house for 
salvage vehicles in the world. In these auctions, we manipulated the way bidders 
could engage in jump bidding, by restricting the maximum amount that bids could 
be submitted above the current standing price. Before describing our experimen-
tal design in detail, we begin with a description of Copart and its online auction 
mechanism.
Copart sells well over a million cars annually through its online virtual auction. 
On average, each business day, Copart auctions around 5,000 vehicles on its site. 
Copart is an intermediary that obtains vehicles from governments, charities, finance 
companies, banks, dealers, fleets, rental car companies, and the insurance industry; 
there are over 150 Copart facilities throughout the United States, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom. Buyers are located all over the world and auctions are conducted 
each business day at various Copart facilities. Our experiments utilize Copart’s larg-
est auction yard (in Houston, Texas) and another geographically different yard in 
upstate New York to examine the effect of price grid changes on observed auction 
outcomes. We use data from 24 auctions—13 run under the company’s baseline 
parameters, and 11 run under altered parameters introduced by us. The volume 
varies across the sales, but each auction has approximately 500 vehicles offered 
for sale.13
A. copart Auctions: Main Features
Copart auctions attract a large number of heterogeneous buyers located around 
the world (auto parts dismantlers, rebuilders, used car dealers, wrecking yards, and 
the public). Upon registering an account with Copart, a buyer can access the “cur-
rent sales” button to view all of the auctions occurring that day, the locations of the 
auctions, and the start times. Buyers can join an auction at any time, and also view 
vehicles in upcoming auctions. Each auction shows pictures of the vehicle up for 
auction, its make, model, and year, along with the list of details shown in Table 1. 
Figure 1 shows a typical auction screen from the Copart auction site.
The Copart bidding process begins with a preliminary bidding (proxy bids) stage. 
The preliminary bidding process, which ends 60 minutes before the start of the 
virtual auction, allows participants from around the world to preview vehicles for 
sale in each of Copart’s facilities in person or over the Internet. Using preliminary 
bidding, participants enter the maximum price (called the “Bid4U Max”) they are 
willing to pay for a specific vehicle and the software incrementally bids for the vehi-
cle on their behalf. In the preliminary bidding stage, all of the preliminary bids are 
12 cf. Harrison and List (2004). 
13 The scale of the experiment is comparable to that of the sequencing experiments with used car auctions 
reported in Grether and Plott (2009). Relatedly, Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2009), use field experiments with a used 
automobile auction company to explore how providing more information (in the form of “Standardized Condition 
Reports” describing a used car’s condition) to bidders affects auction outcomes, particularly revenues. 
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Table 1—Lot Details and Variable Definitions
Actual cash value Estimated retail value of the lot as submitted to Copart by the seller. If 
the lot has been damaged, this is the value prior to the occurrence of 
the damage. The number is only informational.
Repair cost Estimated cost to repair the vehicle as submitted to Copart by the 
seller of the vehicle.
Title state/type Title type denotes the ownership documents that will be transferred to 
the buyer. 
Odometer Odometer codes are shown to reflect the known reliability of the 
odometer reading.
Primary damage Location of the major damage on the car.
Secondary damage Location of the minor damage on the car.
VIN Vehicle Identification Number assigned by the manufacturer.
Body style Body style is the manufacturer’s designation of the vehicle’s 
configuration.
Color Color listed on this site is the common color name that reasonably 
represents the exterior color of the vehicle. 
Engine Engine is the motor. 
Drive and cylinders Manufacturer’s designation of the vehicle’s power train.
Fuel Designates the fuel type used by the engine as designated by the VIN.
Keys Indicates whether Copart is in possession of the keys to the lot.
Figure 1. Screenshot of Copart Bidder Screen
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incremented until only the highest preliminary bid is left. When the online bidding 
begins, the opening price is set equal to the second highest preliminary bid plus one 
increment. As the online bidding process starts, the remaining (highest) preliminary 
bidder has their bid controlled by Copart software, which automatically bids one 
bid increment above the current high bid (standing bid) for the vehicle, until their 
Bid4U Max is reached. Bidders in the online auction are not informed if a bid is 
coming from the preliminary bidder or not.
The car to be auctioned is called a lot and is sold sequentially in lanes at each 
facility called a yard. Once the starting price is determined, the bid increment is set 
based on the current bid. Table 2 shows how the bid increments change during the 
course of an auction, depending on the level of the current (or “standing”) bid. Once 
the auction is underway, bidders can submit bids in real time that are equal to one of 
the following bid grid size:
•	 the	current	bid	plus	the	minimum	increment;	or
•	 the	current	bid	plus	five	times	the	minimum	increment;	or
•	 the	current	bid	plus	ten	times	the	minimum	increment.
As shown in Figure 1, the buttons for the different bid choices available to the 
bidders are located prominently on the lower right-hand side of the bidder screen. 
Bidders are identified by location: bidders in North America are identified by the 
state or province where they are located, and bidders outside of North America are 
identified by country. So from the perspective of market participants, a bidding com-
petition between two or more buyers in the same state cannot be distinguished from 
a single buyer submitting a series of bids.
Once a bidder submits one of these three bids it becomes the new standing bid 
and if no new standing bid is made in two seconds, then there is a five second 
countdown displayed on the bidder screen. If no new standing bid is provided in 
those five seconds, the auction ends. Thus, if no bid is received in seven seconds the 
auction is over. In our data the actual median time between bids is about one sec-
ond with the average time approximately 2.5 seconds. The distribution of interbid 
times is bimodal with a large mode at zero (presumably the automatic increments 
for the winning preliminary bidder) and a second smaller mode at seven seconds. 
Histograms of the distribution of interbid times for the New York and Texas yards 
are presented in, respectively, Figures 2 and 3. In some cases the time between 
Table 2—Minimum Bid Increments
Bid range Minimum increment
$0–$5 $1
$5–$40 $5
$40–$100 $10
$100–$1,000 $25
$1,000–$5,000 $50
$5,000–$25,000 $100
$25,000–$50,000 $250
$50,000–$100,000 $500
$100,000–$10,000,000 $1,000
VoL. 7 No. 3 91grether et al.: cyber-shilling in car auctions
bids exceeds seven seconds, but is never greater than eleven seconds. These longer 
 intervals are caused by delays due to the latencies with the Internet. These auctions 
move quickly with most not exceeding one minute.
Sellers in these auctions include insurance companies, dealers, charities, rental 
car companies, governmental units, and single car sellers. Sellers in Copart auctions 
can and typically do set a “minimum bid”; this is essentially a secret reserve price,14 
14 If the minimum bid is $0, this is listed as a “pure sale” in the auction. If there is a minimum bid required, it is 
always secret to the bidders (but they know that there is a reserve price on the lot). 
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Figure 2. Interbid Times
Figure 3. Interbid Times
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which is unobserved to bidders at the time they choose their bids, such that if the 
highest bid in the auction falls below it, the seller has the option to not sell to the 
highest bidder.15 Sellers who do not want to state a minimum bid may place the lot 
“on approval,” thereby reserving the right to approve the sale at the high bid or to 
negotiate with the high bidder. In these cases at the start of the virtual auctions it 
is announced that the auction is “on approval.” Importantly, if the minimum bid is 
met during the course of the virtual auction, an announcement is made that the lot 
is “sellin’ all the way.”
If the bidding does not reach the reserve price the seller may negotiate with the 
high bidder or in some cases with the second highest bidder. Copart’s new revised 
auction site specifically highlights this feature noting that bidders may engage in 
negotiations with sellers who “reveal or eliminate their minimum bid requirement to 
speed up the final sale to you.” This opportunity for post-auction negotiation is the 
source for some striking results below.
B. Experimental Design: Price grid interventions
In our field experiment we manipulated the price grid that bidders could choose 
when submitting their bid. As we noted above, the standard Copart auction rules 
allow bidders to submit jump bids, which are either five or ten times the bid incre-
ment above the current bid. We call this the baseline treatment, and denote it by 
(1,5,10). We introduced two contrasting treatments. First, we have a fine grid treat-
ment, which restricts bids to only two or three times the bid increment above the 
current bid. We denote this treatment by (1,2,3). Second, we have a coarse grid 
treatment, which allows bidders to bid 10 or 20 times the bid increment above the 
current bid.16 This treatment is referred to as (1,10,20). For convenience, in the 
remainder of this paper, we refer to bids submitted at a level more than one bid 
increment above the current bid as “jumps.”
Two Copart yards—in Houston, Texas and upstate New York—were used in our 
study. The Texas yard has greater volume with two sales per week while the New 
York yard and all the other company yards host only one sale per week. The volume 
varies, but averages around 500 vehicles per sale. At both yards insurance compa-
nies are the owners of around 40 percent of the vehicles offered for sale. At the New 
York site, the other main sources of vehicles are governments and municipalities 
(20 percent) and charities (18 percent). Notably, car dealers account for only about 
10 percent of sales in New York. The seller mix at the Texas site, however, is quite 
different; dealers have the most prominent presence there, and account for 45 per-
cent of the lots offered for sale.
Table 3 lists the sequence of our treatments by date and yard. For each lot we 
have information about the item and summary bid data. The information on the lot 
15 Secret reserve prices are actually commonly observed in real-world auctions, but not completely understood 
from an auction-theoretic point of view. See Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) and Katkar and Reiley (2007) for empirical 
and experimental work exploring secret reserve prices, and Elyakime et al. (1994), Vincent (1995) for theoretical 
analyses. 
16 We had initially proposed a treatment that eliminated jumps completely (i.e., “(1,1,1)”), but this was not 
feasible due to software limitations in Copart’s online bidding system. 
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includes the description (make, model year), damage including repair cost (seller’s 
estimate), mileage, title type and state of registration, and the number of times the 
lot has been previously auctioned. In our empirical work below, these are the main 
variables used to control for heterogeneity across lots. Since these are virtual auc-
tions and, for the most part, bidders are offsite and do not have the opportunity to 
inspect vehicles physically before bidding, we believe that these variables capture 
practically all heterogeneity observed by bidders before they bid. Moreover, our 
treatments were not announced to sellers before the auction, so that they do not have 
an opportunity to adjust their reserve prices in response to our treatments.
The observed variables for each car includes the minimum bid, the starting bid, 
number of bids and jump bids, the size of the jumps, the high bid, the selling price 
(listed as zero if the seller did not accept the price), the high bidder (coded) includ-
ing the state and nationality of the high bidder and the seller’s identity (coded), and 
the type of the seller. The final sale price may differ from the high bid as a result of 
negotiations between the seller and the first or second highest bidder. In addition, for 
each lot we observe the complete sequence of bids and bidder identities, allowing us 
to determine accurately whether a bidder submitted a bid more than one increment 
above the standing bid, and the amount of the jump.
II. Empirical Results
Summary statistics for the two yards and the three treatment conditions are given 
in Table 4. First, we confirm that the treatments are effective in that the proportion of 
jumps in both the coarse and fine grid treatments are significantly different from the 
Table 3—Treatment Application
Yard Date Treatment Number of lots in sample
Texas 2/19/10 1,5,10 (baseline) 407
Texas 2/23/10 1,2,3 (fine grid) 497
Texas 2/26/10 1,5,10 (baseline) 557
Texas 3/2/10 1,5,10 (baseline) 489
Texas 3/5/10 1,2,3 (fine grid) 548
Texas 4/20/10 1,5,10 (baseline) 513
Texas 4/23/10 1,2,3 (fine grid) 723
Texas 4/27/10 1,2,3 (fine grid) 483
Texas 4/30/10 1,5,10 (baseline) 637
New York 5/19/10 1,5,10 (baseline) 712
Texas 5/25/10 1,5,10 (baseline) 687
New York 5/26/10 1,2,3 (fine grid) 655
Texas 5/28/10 1,10,20 (coarse grid) 687
Texas 6/1/10 1,10,20 (coarse grid) 535
New York 6/2/10 1,5,10 (baseline) 583
Texas 6/4/10 1,5,10 (baseline) 524
New York 8/11/10 1,5,10 (baseline) 547
Texas 8/17/10 1,5,10 (baseline) 611
New York 8/18/10 1,10,20 (coarse grid) 546
Texas 8/20/10 1,10,20 (coarse grid) 698
Texas 8/24/10 1,10,20 (coarse grid) 447
New York 8/25/10 1,10,20 (coarse grid) 548
Texas 8/27/10 1,5,10 (baseline) 741
New York 9/1/10 1,5,10 (baseline) 574
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proportions in the baseline (1,5,10) treatment. The observed treatment effects are 
sensible with the number of jumps increasing when the jump size is restricted, and 
falling when the jump size is increased. The actual number of jumps varies some-
what across the auction sites. At the New York location approximately 1.5 percent of 
the bids are jumps with roughly 6 percent of the buyers jumping at least once. Jump 
bids are more frequent at the Texas site with about 9 percent of the bidders jumping 
at least once and jump bids accounting for approximately 2.4 percent of the bids. 
Moreover, the auctions in Texas have about twice as many bids as those at the New 
York yard, and the high bids are roughly twice those at New York.
Second, looking at average prices with the three treatments does not reveal any 
substantial revenue effects of changing the grid size. The average high bid does not 
vary significantly nor does the average sale price (conditional on the vehicle being 
sold). However, the overall revenue effects are ambiguous and consistent across the 
two locations. At both places the high bids and sale prices were slightly higher under 
the fine grid treatment and slightly lower with the coarse treatment, but the differ-
ences were not significant in Texas and only marginally so in New York. However, the 
proportion of vehicles sold decreases at both yards under the coarse grid treatment.
The features of strategic jump bidding emphasized in the existing theoretical lit-
erature are missing from our findings. These models (cf. footnote 9 above) often 
have equilibria in which auctions start or end with jump bids. In our data this does 
not happen. The fraction of first bids that are jumps is only slightly higher than the 
overall jump rates at both locations (0.022 in New York and 0.036 at the Texas site). 
At the New York site, the proportion of final bids that are jumps is about the same 
(1.5 percent) as the overall proportion of jump bids. In Texas, about 3.2 percent of 
the sales conclude with jumps. Overall, these modest figures do not support features 
of equilibria from strategic jump bidding models.
Table 5 summarizes the behavior of sellers at the two locations. There is a sub-
stantial difference in the fractions of cars unsold (20 percent in New York and 
42.8 percent in Texas). Variation in the composition of the seller groups seems to 
account for the differences between the two sites. Insurance companies account for 
about 40 percent of the vehicles at both locations, while dealers sell only about 
Table 4—Average Bidding Behavior for Each Yard/Lot/Treatment
Number Number  High Jump bid Repeat-bid Size of Proportion Sales price
Yard of bidders of bids bid frequency frequency jumps sold if sold 
Texas (1,5,10) 4.15 23.8 5,330 0.024 0.184 440 0.576 3,778 
Texas (1,2,3) 4.52 27.1 5,503 0.035 0.181 186 0.579 3,915 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.21) (0.40) 
Texas (1,10,20) 4.23 26.0 5,201 0.023 0.192 922 0.543 3,592 
(0.20) (0.00) (0.75) (0.00) (00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.22) 
New York (1,5,10) 3.02 15.2 2,217 0.015 0.013 322 0.812 2,122 
New York (1,2,3) 2.87 11.3 2,478 0.019 0.014 154 0.811 2,466
(0.08) (0.49) (0.12) (0.01) (0.47) (0.00) (0.96) (0.06) 
New York (1,10,20) 3.21 11.3 2,222 0.006 0.013 508 0.765 2,379 
(0.01) (0.40) (0.97) (00) (0.99) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are significance levels for testing equality with baseline (1,5,10).
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10 percent of the vehicles in New York but nearly half the vehicles in Texas. While 
insurance companies in our sample sell over 80 percent of their cars at auction, 
dealer sales rates are mainly in the 35 percent range. Table 6 gives results simi-
lar to those in Table 5, for vehicles auctioned by dealer and insurance companies. 
The  re-auctioning17 of cars at the Texas site is about twice the rate observed at the 
New York site. Looking at the number of times a vehicle has been auctioned, the 
median is one in New York and two in Texas and the numbers are about double at 
17 A re-auctioned lot is a lot that was previously offered in an earlier auction but not sold. 
Table 5—Seller Behavior
Texas New York
Number of lots Percent Number of lots Percent
All lots All lots  
Sell at high bid 4,948 50.5 Sell at high bid 3,183 76.3
Negotiate price 660 6.7 Negotiate price 154 3.7
Withdraw 4,197 42.8 Withdraw 833 20.0
Total 9,805 Total 4,170  
Lots with high bid < minimum bid Lots with high bid < minimum bid
Sell at high bid 2,446 34.7 Sell at high bid 446 38.6
Negotiate price 660 9.4 Negotiate price 154 13.3
Withdraw 3,943 55.9 Withdraw 556 48.1
Total 7,049 Total 1,156  
Lots with high bid ≥ minimum bid Lots with high bid ≥ minimum bid
Sell at high bid 2,502 90.8 Sell at high bid 2,737 90.8
Negotiate price 0 0 Negotiate price 0 0
Withdraw 254 9.2 Withdraw 277 9.2
Total 2,756 Total 3,014
Table 6—Seller Behavior: Car Dealers versus Insurance Companies
Car dealers Insurance companies
Number 
of lots Percent
Number 
of lots Percent
All lots All lots  
Sell at high bid 1,291 27 Sell at high bid 5,065 83
Negotiate price 327 7 Negotiate price 301 5
Withdraw 3,121 66 Withdraw 742 12
Total 4,739 Total 6,108  
Lots with high bid < minimum bid Lots with high bid < minimum bid
Sell at high bid 1,093 24 Sell at high bid 1,341 62
Negotiate price 327 7 Negotiate price 301 14
Withdraw 3,069 68 Withdraw 535 24
Total 4,489 Total 2,177  
Lots with high bid > minimum bid Lots with high bid > minimum bid
Sell at high bid 198 79 Sell at high bid 3,724 95
Negotiate price 0 0 Negotiate price 0 0
Withdraw 52 21 Withdraw 207 5
Total 250 Total 3,931
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the  quartiles and, at the ninety-ninth percentile: 7 for New York and 14 for Texas. 
In the New York auctions the high bids usually exceed or meet the reserve prices 
(72.3 percent of the time), while in Texas the situation is almost the reverse with 
high bids being less than the reserve in 70.2 percent of the auctions. Cars that do 
not sell at an auction often return later, which makes the revenue effects of changing 
proportions sold more ambiguous.
Results from linear regressions, reported in Table 7, confirm the robustness of the 
results discussed above after controlling for a large number of car characteristics. In 
New York, high bids and sale prices are about $200 to $300 higher in the fine grid 
treatment with borderline significance levels. In this table, FINEGRID is an indica-
tor for the (1,2,3)-price grid treatment, while COARSEGRID denotes the (1,10,20) 
treatment ((1,5,10) serves as the baseline treatment). None of the treatment vari-
ables are significant in the Texas equations.
Post-Auction Price Negotiation.—As we discussed before, due to the prevalent 
use of secret reserve prices, sellers are not required to sell the car at the high bid. 
From Table 5, we see that seller behavior varies substantially depending on whether 
the minimum bid (i.e., secret reserve price) is exceeded in the auction. For the Texas 
Table 7—Regression Results for New York and Texas Sales
New York Texas
Dependent variable OLS high bid OLS sale price if sold OLS high bid OLS sale price if sold
FINEGRID 197.8
(1.7)*
284.6
(2.3)**
93.3
(0.8)
33.4
(0.4)
COARSEGRID 71.8
(0.7)
51.6
(0.5)
77.0
(0.7)
−13.0
(0.1)
Odometer 5.2
(0.8)
 −4.3
(0.6)
9.7
(1.8)*
1.5
(0.4)
Actual odometer 44.7
(0.5)
−51.9
(0.5)
909.9
(9.9)***
461.0
(5.6)***
Seller book value 0.26
(49.7)***
0.27
(46.3)***
0.33
(118.8)***
0.26
(65.4)***
Age −168.7
(7.8)***
−142.0
(62)***
−73.7
(4.3)***
−211.7
(11.3)***
Age squared 2.1
(3.8)***
2.2
(3.7)***
0.85
(2.0)**
4.2
(7.3)***
Constant 6,518.3
(0.6)
−3,168.8
(0.3)
−132.5
(0.1)
2,156.8
(2.6)**
Observations 4,161 3,329 9,781 5,593
Cubic trend
Make dummies
Lane dummies
Primary damage dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
r2 0.64 0.65 0.73 0.70
Notes: T-stats are in parentheses. FINEGRID denotes the (1,2,3) grid treatment, and COARSEGRID is the (1,10,20) 
treatment. The omitted treatment is (1,5,10). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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sales, we see that when the final bid is below the minimum bid, sellers sell the car at 
the final bid only 34.7 percent of the time, and withdraw the car 55.9 percent. When 
the final bid exceeds the minimum bid, however, sellers sell the car 90.8 percent of 
the time. The remaining 9.2 percent are cars that are not sold even when the final bid 
exceeds the minimum bid, which arises from buyers reneging their winning bid.18 
When a buyer reneges, the seller can negotiate with the second highest bidder to sell 
the lot. This results in sales 70 percent of the time. Similar figures hold for the New 
York sales.
As we noted above, car dealers make up around 45 percent of the sellers in Texas, 
while they constitute only about 10 percent of the sellers in New York. In Table 6, 
we compare the behavior for car dealers versus insurance companies, which are the 
largest group of sellers in both Texas and New York. As we see there, the differential 
behavior of these two types of sellers can explain the differences in seller behavior 
between Texas and New York—car dealers are much less likely to sell their cars at 
the high bid than insurance companies (27 percent versus 83 percent).19
These differences in selling rates across seller types are associated with differ-
ences in the use of minimum bids. Table 8 gives regression results with the reserve 
price (ie., the minimum bid) as the dependent variable using the same independent 
variables as in Table 7 plus indicator variables for the seller being a dealer or an 
insurance company. As many vehicles are auctioned with a reserve price of $0, the 
so-called “pure sales” mentioned above, the equation is estimated using a Tobit 
specification. The results show that dealers’ reserve prices are substantially higher 
(by $1,000 to $3,000) and insurance companies’ reserve prices are much lower 
(by $3,000) than those of other sellers. Since the price grid treatments were not 
announced in advance of the auctions, the treatment effects on reserve prices should 
be zero, which is confirmed by the insignificance of their regression coefficients.
A. A Puzzle: repeat Bidding Behavior
The results discussed above indicate that our manipulated changes in grid size 
appeared to have only modest (if any) effect on car revenues. However, here we 
present evidence on a particularly striking and unexpected bidding phenomenon that 
occurred with some frequency in Copart auctions—that of repeat bidding.20 We say 
that a buyer engages in repeat bidding when he/she submits two consecutive bids. 
Thus, repeat bidders are raising their own bids; obviously it is difficult to rationalize 
such behavior because, by repeat bidding, a buyer essentially increases the price he 
pays if he were to win the auction. Repeat bids make up less than 2 percent of the 
bids in New York. In Texas, however, the proportion of repeat bids is much higher, 
ranging from 14 percent to over 21 percent.
18 Buyers that renege on their bid must pay a penalty of $400 or 10 percent of the sales price, whichever is 
greater. This amount is paid to Copart. In addition, a seller can relist a car up to three times. After that they must pay 
an $85 fee to relist it again. Buyer fees for winning bid vary by state, the actual fees can be determined using the 
Copart Fee Calculator at http://gotparts.com/copart/Fees.html. 
19 Table 8 summarizes the characteristics of cars brought to auction by seller type. 
20 In the history of the Copart auctions, repeat bidding at one time was not allowed. However, an uproar by the 
bidders caused Copart to allow such bidding to be part of its current design. 
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These auctions move very fast with the typical lot lasting under a minute, so that 
it is possible that bidders may accidentally and mistakenly bid against themselves: 
“trembling,” in short. This explanation is plausible for much of the repeat bidding at 
the New York site. There, most bidders who repeat-bid do so only once or twice in a 
weekly sale, and the most frequent do so on the order of only 10 to 20 times.
Additionally, the repeat bids are also (partially) explained by examining their 
timing patterns. Repeat bids occur with a longer lag, i.e., with a longer time interval 
from the preceding bid, than nonrepeat bids. At a typical sale, the median time inter-
val between repeat bids is six seconds while it is only two seconds for the nonrepeat-
ing bids. Recall that reserve prices at Copart auctions are secret (that is, unknown 
by bidders when they choose their bids). Moreover, if the bidding starts above the 
secret reserve price or goes above it during the bidding, an audible announcement 
that the lot is “selling all the way” is emitted on the website. However, virtually all 
of the repeat bids take place below the reserve price. At the Texas site the proportion 
of bids that are repeats drops by more than half when the minimum bid is passed. 
This suggests that some repeat bidding (and, to a lesser extent, jump bidding) may 
be symptomatic of a type of search behavior by which some bidders try to discover 
the reserve price, but do not want to risk going over it.
Table 8—Reserve Price Regressions
Dependent variable Texas reserve price New York reserve price
FINEGRID 110.2
(0.6)
353.2
(1.1)
COARSEGRID −172.8
(1.0)
−11.8
(0.0)
Odometer  26.6
(3.2)***
12.21
(6.3)***
Actual 933.9
(6.7)***
−350.0
(1.3)
Seller book value 0.48
(113.9)***
0.30
(23.6)***
Dealer 1414.4
(5.9)***
3250.0
(9.1)***
Insurer −3621.8
(15.0)***
−2882.6
(10.4)***
Age 129.2
(3.9)***
−273.7
(4.7)***
Age squared −3.1
(3.9)***
 3.2
(2.3)**
Cubic trend
Make, lane, and damage dummies
Make dummies
Lane dummies
Damage dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations 9,117 2,998
Note: Excludes vehicles sold on approval.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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B. repeat Bidders in Texas. Are These Shills?
While trembles and discovering the reserve price may explain some of the repeat 
bidding behavior, a deeper examination of the repeat bidding patterns in Texas 
reveals some peculiar and suspicious behavior among a small subset of buyers. 
In our Texas auctions, we observe approximately 260,000 bids, of which 18 per-
cent (about 47,000) are repeat bids. There are 5,659 different bidders in the sam-
ple, but six buyers account for over 35,000 of the repeat bids. The number of bids, 
repeat bids, number of high bids, and cars purchased by the six buyers are shown in 
Table 9. These six buyers, all from Texas, had the high bid in nearly 20 percent of 
all the Texas auctions in our sample. If we look at the auctions in which these buyers 
had the highest bid, another sharp pattern emerges. With only one exception, each 
buyer was the high bidder in auctions from a single seller. The exception is buyer 
4 (made the fourth largest number of repeat bids) who won multiple auctions from 
three sellers.21 There is another buyer (tagged as number 7 in Table 9) who, while 
not engaging in repeat bidding, was the high bidder in 315 auctions, of which 285 
pertained to the same seller (different from those shown in Table 9); only 5 out of 
these 315 auctions resulted in sales.
These behavioral patterns among these seven bidders are strongly suggestive as 
actions of bidders working in cahoots with specific sellers; in short, these seven 
bidders could be shill bidders. Kaufmann and Wood (2005, 2003), in their study of 
eBay coin auctions, list four types of behavior which they use to detect shill bidding:
 (i) Shill bidders are more likely to buy items from few sellers;
 (ii) They are more likely to drop out early from the auction;
 (iii) They are more likely to bid at larger increments
 (iv) Less likely to win an auction.
21 Buyers and sellers are identified in the data by coded numbers. We know that some large sellers, for example 
insurance companies, have multiple seller numbers. It could be that buyer 4 is dealing with a single large seller who 
may have multiple lots or makes of cars, but we are not able to verify this. 
Table 9—Outcomes for the Suspected Shill Bidders in Texas Auctions 
Buyer Repeats Bids High bid Buys High bid > reserve
1 9,451 20,479 426 14 4
2 8,746 12,986 373 24 15
3 7,661 16,580 378 40 24
4 5,296 8,723 301 6 5
5 3,542 5,529 151 18 8
6 615 1,543 277 8 3
7 18 7,244 315 5 5
Total 35,329 73,084 2,221 115 64
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For the seven bidders mentioned above, we have already shown (i). Our manip-
ulations of the price grid are ideal for testing (iii), and the evidence here is imme-
diate: this group of seven (out of 5,000+) bidders utilize the ten increment option 
(when it is available) much more often than other bidders; these bidders made about 
 one-third of all ten increment jumps in the (1,5,10) and (1,10,20) treatments.
Apparently, these bidders prefer a coarser grid treatment because it provides an 
opportunity for more visibly aggressive bidding. Such bidding may not have much 
of an effect on auction outcomes in a private value environment in which bidders 
face little common uncertainty. But in the Copart environment, when bidders face 
common uncertainty about the level of competition, as well as potential common 
value components of the used cars, more aggressive bidding on the part of some 
bidders may be interpreted by other bidders as “good news” which might lead them 
to raise their estimate of the level of competition or the object’s value, leading to 
a higher price.22 Relatedly, a behavioral economics literature has also argued that 
more aggressive bidding can induce excitement or a frenzy among bidders and drive 
up prices, even in noncommon value settings.23 This intuition highlights an inter-
esting connection between the grid size manipulations in our experiments and how 
they impact the calculus of shill bidding.
Strictly speaking, Kaufmann and Wood’s criteria numbers (ii) and (iv) do not 
apply to our context, because winning a Copart auction does not imply winning 
an object, due to the possibility of post-auction price negotiation with the seller. 
However, the logic of (ii) and (iv), adapted to our setting, implies that shill bid-
ders should be less likely to consummate a sale, regardless of whether they win 
the auction. Looking at the data, we see sales rates are systematically lower for our 
suspected shills. Only about 5 percent of the auctions in which these seven buy-
ers were the high bidders (115 out of 2,200) resulted in sales; in over 95 percent 
of these auctions, the high bid was lower than the reserve price, which enabled 
the seller to relist the car without paying Copart’s relisting fee (up to three times; 
cf. footnote 19). Thus, these suspected shill bidders don’t often take possession of 
cars which they “win” in these auctions, while the sales rates for these same sellers 
on auctions with high bids submitted by other (nonshill) buyers is nearly 80 percent. 
What happened to the 115 cars that the shill bidders actually bought? We have no 
evidence that these were relisted by the sellers (which would entail a reneging fee 
for the buyer); presumably, the sellers (who are all used car dealers) could sell these 
cars through other channels.
Furthermore, while these seven shill bidders win cars which are never relisted 
only around 5 percent of the time, they win (i.e., are the high bidder in) over 40 per-
cent of the auctions of vehicles that appear more than once. (At one extreme, these 
bidders were the high bidders in 59 out of the 95 auctions for the 19 cars which were 
re-auctioned five times in our data!) Since the typical reason for relisting a car is that 
the high bid did not exceed the reserve price, this suggests that the shill bidders are 
not able to drive up the nonshill bids “high enough” for these cars.
22 See Izmalkov (2004). 
23 See Ding et. al. (2005); Ku, Galinsky, and Murnighan (2008); Adam et. al. (2011); Malmendier and Lee 
(2011). 
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In short, these seven prominent bidders in Texas do behave in ways which have 
been associated with shill bidding in existing studies.
As a side note, we also find that these seven bidders in the Texas auctions are 
more likely to “win” an auction (resulting in a purported sale of a car) under a coarse 
rather than finer grid. Specifically, grouping these seven bidders together, we find 
that they win 34 percent of the auctions in the baseline (1,5,10) condition; this rises 
to 40 percent (t = 2.4) in the coarse grid (1,10,20) treatment but drops to 12 percent 
in the fine grid (1,2,3) treatment (t = 9.0).
III. Quo Vadis? Summaries and Conclusions
In this paper, we report the results from a field experiment in which we varied 
the size and scope of the price grid in ascending auctions run by a large online used 
car seller. We used these experimental manipulations to examine the effects of grid 
size on auction outcomes, including the probability of sale and revenue from a sale. 
We analyzed data from 24 online auctions at two auction locations (New York and 
Texas) at which approximately 15,000 vehicles were auctioned. In both New York 
and Texas , a coarsened price grid (which allows bidders to “jump” to amounts much 
higher than the current bid) lowers the probability of sale. In Texas, our findings can 
be explained by a small and peculiar group of buyers present in the auctions. These 
bidders exhibit behavior which, in the existing literature, has been associated with 
“shill” bidders confederate with sellers, who attempt to drive up the price of the cars.
As far as we are aware, this constitutes some of the first field evidence for shill 
bidding in the economics literature. Indeed, our knowledge of the Copart online 
auction marketplace and conversations with company representatives suggests that 
eliminating shill bidding in online auctions is virtually impossible since one can 
easily sign up for multiple different accounts. The ease in which one can disguise 
initial intentions in these auctions is almost costless.
Given the difficulties in getting rid of shill bidding in these auctions, we conclude 
with some evidence regarding the disruption caused by shill bidding in these auc-
tions. How much of an advantage does shill bidding yield to the sellers who employ 
them? Our evidence suggests that these bidders had only a small and negligible 
effect on sellers’ revenues. Most of the auctions in which they were the high bidders 
had bids below the sellers’ reserve prices, and did not result in cars being sold. There 
were just 1,045 auctions in which one of the suspected shills was the second highest 
bidder, and, of these, 795 resulted in cars being sold (with median price $6,800). 
Thus, there were few auctions in which these shill bidders played the role of the 
marginal price-setting bidder.24 Indeed, when we restrict attention to the sellers who 
employed shill bidders, we find that the distributions of purchase prices and winning 
bids for auctions won by the shill bidders are not significantly different from those 
24 For all auctions in which these bidders participated that resulted in sales, the median high bid was $7,700 
(interquartile range $4,700 to $11,400), as compared to a median of $1900 (interquartile range of $875 to $3,750) 
for all other sellers. However, it is likely that these differences arise mainly because the sellers who would employ 
shills tend to specialize in high-end cars. 
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won by other bidders.25 Thus, while our analysis shows the ease with which shill 
bidders can operate in the online auction environment, the evidence here suggests 
that they do not disrupt the functioning of this marketplace.
More broadly, “cyber-shilling” constitutes just one among many strategies 
that sellers may employ in an online auction setting. Two other important strate-
gies used by sellers in the auctions we study are secret reserve prices, as well as 
post-auction price negotiation. In ongoing work, we are conducting additional 
field experiments to gauge the effect of seller strategies on bidder behavior and 
auction outcomes.
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